*。The book uses the American definition of trillion, i.e.: one thousand billion，and not the old European definition of trillion. *。The term ‘bad loan” has been used in a generic sense to refer to all nonperforming loans; for a detailed discussion about terminology and ways of measuring bad loans see “Notes on Bad Loans,” page 311. 本书的核心指导原则是构建一个易于理解的叙事，让不 熟悉日本银行业复杂生态的非日本读者们，也能相对轻松地 进行阅读。为此，我 们采取了以下简化 措施，
- 日语姓名格式: 采用美国人最熟悉的形式书写日语姓 名《〔〈即姓氏在后的顺序)，而 非传统的日语姓氏 在前。 2.汇率基准: 在多数货币换算中，采用了约100 日 元况 1 美元的近似 汇率。实际汇率在过去二十年中波动剧烈，范 围从150 日元 兑1美元到80 日元竞1 美元不等，且本书撰 写 时约处于120 日元竞1美元附近。为换算方便，我 们采用 100 日元竞1 美元 的汇率。在这段叙述中有一个例外情况， 在二战结束后的一段 时间,，当时汇率固定在每350 日元兑换 1 美元。
- “万亿? 单位定义: 本书采用美国对”trillion” 的定义， 即一万亿〈1,000,000,000,000)，而非上昌有的欧洲定义《该 定义中，*trillion” 曾指“百万亿”，即1,000,000^2)。
- “坏账”定义: 书中使用的术语“坏账”bad loan) 是广
义概念 ，泛 指所有 不良贷款。关于坏账的术语定义、计量标 准及方法的详细探讨 ，请参见第311 页的”坏账 说 明注 释”。 Foreword 前言 In recent years, the state of Japan’s economy has seemed a_riddle wrapped in an enigma to the outside world. A decade ago, the country appeared to have created an extraordinary_ economic miracle，rebuilding itself dazzling Speed after the devastation of World War 1 to become the second largest economy in the world. Indeed， “miracle”” was So remarkable that some observers were predicting that Japan would overtake America, as its mighty _ corporations stormed into Europe and America， stunning competitors with their manufacturing skills-and snapping up trophy asses ranging from golf courses to film studios. 近年来，日本的经济状况对国际社会而言，宛如一个关中之 谜。十年前，这个国家似乎 创造了一个非凡的经济奇迹，在 二战的废奸之 上，它 以令人目眩的速度重建 国度，一跃成为 世界 第二大经济体。事 实上，这个“奇迹 “是如此引人瞩目，
以至于一些观察家曾预 言日本将超越 美国。彼时，其强大的 企业大举进军欧美市场，凭借精湛的制造技艺令竞争对手震 惊不已，并大嫂收购各类标志性资产 ，从高尔夫球场 到电影 制片厂，尽 数收入赛中。 友帮注: arjaaol/e mrappea 1mn an em181a: 谋为“絮内之赤”” 鞭媒 为“包间 在磁历内扩吉三交 But in the last few years, this miracle has soured. Since 1990, the economy has stagnated, debt to GDP levels has risen towards 150 percent, deflation has taken hold to a degree nor seen since the 1930s U.S. Depression, and the country’s credit rating has been downgraded to the same level as Botswana’s. Meanwhile, the Japanese banks have become engulfed in atidal wave of bad loans, on a scale unprecedented in history. 然而，在过去的几年里，这一奇迹已然褪色变质。自1990 年以来 ，经济陷入停滞 ，债务占GDP 比重逼近150%，通 货紧缩程度之深更是堪比1930 年代美国大萧条以来之罕见， 而国家的信用评级更是被下调至与博茨瓦纳( Botswana)相 当的水平。与此同时，日本各大银行深陷坏账洪流之中，坏 账规模更是史无前例。
The Japanese government estimates that this bad loan problem has reached Y100,000 billion, or about one trillion dollars, during the last decade; private sector economists put the figure two or three times this，Either way，the problem continues to bubble-which also puts Japan in a grim historical category of its own. For while plenty of other countries have also experienced banking crises in the past， these have usually been resolved after a few years. what makes Japan remarkable, alas, is that a full thirteen years after the bubble burst，many of the countrys biggest banks-which also happen to be some of the largest in the world-are still effectively insolvent. 日本政府估计，过去十年间，银行坏 账问题已攀升 至约100 万亿日元〈按近似 汇率折合约1 万亿美元)，而私营 机构经 济学家估算的数值则达到政府估值的两至三倍。不管是100 万亿还是200 万亿，坏 账问题依然在持续 恶化，这也使得日 本书写了经济史上独一份的惨淡章节。虽然，许多其他国家 在过去也经历了银行 人危机， 但这些危机通常能在几年内得以 解决。日本面临问题的独特之处在于，虽然泡沫破裂已经整 整过去了十三年，该国最大的几家银行 ，同时也是世界 上最 大的几家银行 ，仍然实际上处于破产状态。
But why have these problems developed? Why do they drag on? And why has the Japanese government been so unwilling to do anything about it? 然而,为何这些问题会不断恶化? 又为何能久拖不决? 日本 政府为何始终极度抗拒采取实质行动? And-perhaps important all-does Japan’s eXxperience hold lessons for other countries which have also suffered the collapse of an asset bubble or a period of prolonged _ economic stagnation， continental Europe, or some of Japan’s other neighbors in 或许最关键 的是: 日本的经验教训，是否能为同样遭受资产 泡沫破灭或长期经济停滞困扰的其他国家提供借鉴 ，诸如欧 洲大陆的部分地区 ，抑或是日本在亚洲的其他邻邦? This book explores some of these questions，but from a slightly unusual point of view. In recent years, there have been plenty of academic accounts of what has gone wrong in Japan’s economy—and what might one day go right-from a “top-down’” macro economic point of view. However this
book tries to explore these issues from a “bottom-up”， more anecdotal perspective，that explains cultural context and political pressures at work in Japan. Above all， it looks at the issue of incentives—or more Specifically the fact that the incentives driving Japanese behavior today often different from what outsiders from America or Europe might assume to be normal. 本书试图探究上述部分问题 ，但采用了一个略有不同寻常的 视角。近年来 ，已有大量学术论述从“ 自上而下?的宏观经济 角度，剖析了日本经济的问题 根源，以及未来复苏的可能路 径 。然而，本书则力图通过 一种“自下而 上”、更具事例 性质 的视角来审视这些问题，旨在阐明运作于日本社会 的文化背 景与政治压力。尤 为关键 的是，它聚焦于激励机制问题，更 确切地说，揭示了当前驱动日本主体行为的激励机制 ，往往 过异于来自美国或欧洲的外界人士所认定的“常态”。 To do this, the book narrates the history of one specific epitomizes Japan’s_ economic problems and the search for a solution to them-the Long Term Credit Bank later renamed Shinsei. This was once the ninth largest bank in the world and a pillar of Japan’s post-war system. However in 1998 it collapsed, and was Subsequently deemed to have had an eye-popping $50
billion of bad loans on its books, much of which had not been visible before. The bank was then nationalized and Sold to new owners. These were a group of American and European investors introduce foreign management techniques as a bold new experiment financial reform，And ways，this revolutionary step. For until the sale of LTCB, no foreigners had ever attempted to bash their way So deeply Japan’s financial world，let alone change the country’s hallowed corporate ways. 为此，本书以一家特定银行的历史为叙事主线 ，该 行既深刻 体现了日本的经济困 局，也凝聚着寻求破局之道的努力。这 家银行 便是长期信用银行(Long Term Credit Bank, LTCB)， 后更名为新生银行(Shinsei)。它曾是全球第九大银行，刘 是日本战后经济体系的支柱之一 。然而在1998 年，该 行宣 告倒闭，随后被查明其账面上存在着令人惊骇的500 亿美元 坏账,而这其中大部分此前从未暴露。该银行遂被国家接管， 并准备出售给一支由欧美投资者组成的团队。他们尝试 引入 外资管理技术，将其作为日本金融改革的一项大胆实验。从 诸多层面看，这堪称革命性的一步。因为在长期信用银行出 售之 前 ，还未有外国公司试图如此深入地渗透日本金融界， 更因论试图改变该国根深东国的企业行为准则。
There are two reasons why this tale is important-and not just to banking experts. Firstly, the problems sitting inside the Japanese banks offer a telling insight into the broader issue of what went wrong in the country during the last decade. For unless the country’s financial system can be properly fixed, it seems unlikely that the worlds second largest economy will ever be restored to vibrant growth. 该案例的重要性不 仅限于银行业专家，其意义 深广，原 因有 二。首先，日 本各大银行内部的沉疾桨疾，为深入理解过去 十年间该国整体经济究竟何处失 序，提供了一 份有力的剖析。 若该国的金融体系无法得到有效修复 ，那么作为世界第二大 经济体，它似乎将难以重新焕发莲勃的经济活力。 Secondly, the tale that has unfolded at Shinsei cuts to the paradox Japanese culture: strange love-hate relationship with the outside world. During much of its history Japan has existed in a state of self-imposed isolation，Viewing outsiders suspicion，Yet alongside this xenophobic streak, its periods of greatest renaissance haveperversely-tended to occur when Japan has deliberately set out to borrow ideas from outside， Usually as a result of a sudden external “shock”. One case of this occurred back in the middle of the 19th century，
when American warships barged into Japanese waters for the first time and forced the shogun rulers to open up their country to the outside world. This triggered an internal revolution that left Japan grappling to “catch up”” with the outside mimicking technology， considerable success. Then, after Japan lost World War | a similar process of “catch up” and “copying” occurred: Within a few short decades, Japan copied manufacturing skills American conquerors—and rebuilt economy at top speed. 其次，新生银行所经历的事情，切中了日 本文化中的一 个深 刻悖论: 那便是其对外部世界爱恨交织的复杂关系。在其历 史长河的大部分时间 里，日本都处于自我隔离之 中，以强烈 的怀疑态度审视外界 。然而，与这种排外倾向并存的诡异事 实是，其最伟大的文艺复兴时期，往往发生在日本刻意 向外 借鉴 之时，且通常源于一场突如其来 的外部“冲击”。此模 式的一个经典例证出现在19 世纪中时: 当时，美 国军舰首 次 闻入日本海域，人迪使幕府统治者向外界打开 国门。这一事 件引发了一 场内部革命 ，促使日本通过效仿外国技术来奋起 “追赶”外部世界，并取得了相当 可观的成就。随后，日本 在第二次世界大战战败后，又经历了一场类似 的“追赶”与 “复制”进程: 短短数十年间，日本向其美国占领 者学习制
巢形注: 1853 合，玫国医印度 天风梧伟人轨tthewr C Perr凡 次4 必竣黑漆的车汽动力盏现疡人入江户小( 今医讽 小)，起 力威网咱藉开开内口、且冬通谓，克迫豪府俭订《刀老英于 条区崩办死了菩失党太200 合历光锁 周尖大，克允“ 畦笑 What makes the tale of Shinsei bank interesting is that it echoes these earlier periods of cultural collision，And though it is not yet dear whether it will deliver such a happy ending, the new foreign owners have arrived at Shinsei at a time when many of Japan’s intellectual elite recognize that something has been going wrong in their country-and are Searching for solutions to put it right. 新生银行案例的引人入胜 之处在于，它复刻了此前那些 文化 碰撞 的历史时刻。虽然目前尚难断言这场变革能否迎来一个 同样 美好的结局 ，但值得关注的是，这群外资财团入主新生 银行 之际 ，恰恰 是日本国内许多知识精英意识到他们的国家 出了些问题，且他们正在积极探寻解决之道。 narrative falls_ parts， section i 放ustrates the rise and fall of Japan’s post-war financial System by telling the tale of LTCB-and,in particular the
Story of Katsunobu Onogi, the last president of LTCB, a epitomizes post-war Japanese economic System. The second section centers on Tim Collins，an American entrepreneur，who in many ways epitomizes distinctively American approach businessand an approach that is the polar opposite of the modus operandi of men such as Onogi. Collins bashed his Way into the Japanese corporate world back in 1999, when he helped to organize a foreign investment consortium that acquired the collapsed LTCB, and thus set the stage for the creation of Shinsei. 全书氢事分为三部分。第一部分通过讲述长期信用银行 CLTCB)，的兴衰 史，尤其是其末任行长大野木克信 (CKatsunobu Onogi) 的个人沉浮，来前杰战 后日本金融体 系的崛起 与崩塌，大野木的人生轨迹堪称战 后日本经济体制 的浓缩体现。第二部分则聚焦美国企业家蒂姆’柯林斯(Tim Collins)。他在诸多方面代表了鲜明的美式商业思维，这种 思维与大野木等人的行事之道截然对立。1999 年 ，柯林斯 率外资财 团强势 进入日本企业界，主导收购 了破产 的长期信 用银行，由此为新生银行(Shinsei) 的诞生 铺就道路。 The last section focuses on this period, telling the tale via Masamoto Yashiro， Japanese
businessman appointed to run the new bank. He has spent the last three years trying to carve out a_new vision of reform-and the wildly contrasting Japanese and American approaches to business,，in what he hopes some type of Hegelian dialectic. 最后一部分聚焦于这一关键时期，以被任命执掌新生银行的 日籍企业家八城政基(Masamoto Yashiro) 的故事为主线展 开氢事。过去三 年间，他致力于开创改革新愿景，并尝试融 合日美截然不同的商业理念 ，他将这一过程视为某种黑格尔 式的辩证演进。 Two words of caution. First, | have deliberately focused the book on individual characters，and these three men particular in an _ attempt to make the opaque world of Japanese banking seem alittle more accessible. However， in describing the problems in LTCB before 1998, 1 do not mean to “pick on”Onogi or LTCB. On the contrary， should be emphasized believe Onogi to be an honorable man，who trying defend Japanese values and has become a tragic victim of the System as a result. What makes the history of LTCB so desperately relevant situation epitomizes a pattern of behavior that was happening at all
Japanese banks, including those that have survived , and， is still continuing to some degree. If any reader doubts this， they need only glance at the revelations that erupted in the autumn of 2003 about the “under-reporting” of bad loans at Resona,Japan’s fifth largest bank-a dismal，ongoing saga that could have been taken straight from the pages of 特此申明两点注意 事项。首先，本书聚焦于个体人物，尤其 是这三位主角，和旨在使史涩难懂 的日本金融世界更容易理解。 然而，在描述1998 年之前长期信用银行 的问题时，并非刻 意”针对”大野木或该行 。恰恰相 反 ，必须强调 的是，我认为 大野木是令人尊克的 ，他毕生致力于捍卫日本价值理念，却 也因此沦为体制的悲剧 性牺牲品。长 期信用银行 的历史与当 下困境产生如此强烈共鸣的根源在于，它深刻映射出一种行 为模式，这种模式曾普遍存在 于所有日本银行《包括那些幸 存至今的银行)，且在某种程度上仍在延续。若有读者 心存 疑虑，只需敬一眼2003 年秋爆出的关于日本第五大银行， 理 索纳银行(Resona) 坏账”眶报” 丑闻便可知晓: 这场阴郁 且持续 的冰剧，促然是长期信用银行事件的翻版重演。 Secondly，this book does set out to present any comprehensive “prescription Japan’s economic problems. Nor does it take a clear stand on the
debate that obsesses many American economists: Namely whether a “solution “to Japan’s woes should focus first on Supply issues (i.e. Structural reform) or demand issues (i.e. monetary policy and/or devaluation and/or the savings Surplus)， Although believe eventually combination of both measures will be needed as part of a coordinated package，the demand issues largely outside the scope of this book. 其次，本书 无意提出任何全面方案，为如何解决日本的经济 问题开具药方。它亦未在众多美国经济学家热议的议题上明 确支持某一 方: 即解决日本困境的”出路”应优先聚焦于供给 端问题〈即结构 性改革)，还是需求 端问题〈即货币政策及/ 或本币贬值及/或储某过剩)。尽管我确信，未来终需某种二 者的协调组合方能破解困 局 ，但需求端问题基本 超出了本书 However the LTCB tale does offer a general moral about Structural reform: Namely that if a country continually tries short-term dinging outworn institutions, and refusing to adapt to a changing world with some “creative destruction -to use Schumpeters famous phrase-this can carry a terrible long-term cost, not just in terms of lost growth but also shattered lives. In making this
point, 1 do not mean to argue that the only “solution “to Japan’s problems is to blindly copy a ruthlessly free-market， American approach to business. The events of the last two years have shown that there are plenty of flaws in the American system as well-and the Wall street philosophy Sits uneasily with many admirable Japanese values. Yet， adopting an extreme free market system is not necessarily the only way for a country to fix a _broken banking system or remove dead wood from the corporate world. Sweden， to name but one example, fixed its banking woes in the partly government intervention. possible to imagine that a more collectivist，state-driven reform model might be better suited to Japan. 然而，长期信用银行的案例确实为结构性改革提供了一个普 适 性的警示: 即倘若一个国家持续固守过时的制度架构，拒 绝通过某种“创造 性破坏”借用熊彼特这一著名理念)来适 应变局 、规避短期阵痛 ，那么它所承受的长期代价将是灾难 性的，这不仅意味着增长机遇的丧失，更将导致 无数人生就 此破碎。在冰述这一观点时,我 并非主张日 本问题 的唯一”出 路”在于言目照搬美国式的自由 市场逻辑。看老唐星球 加蕉 xmtx 93 001 过去两年的事件已充分暴露出美国体制同样存 在 大量缺陷，而华尔街的哲学理念亦与诸多值得珍视 的日本 价值 观念格格不入 。诚然，采用极端的自由市场体系 绝非 修复银行体系桨疾或清除企业界
沉涤积弊的唯一路径 。仅 举一例: 瑞典在1990 年代初期便 借助政府干预之手，成功化解了其银行业危机。我们完全有 理由假设，一种更趋集体 主义、国家主导的改革模式，或许 更 能适 配日本的国情。 琴尹注: oseph Schumpeter (约酚夫。允丝兰)，物她乔经 游学袍，“ 倒送隆王妹” (creat1ve aestruct1om) 姑赴 英心 理论 ，背创新必然伴悦同和攻大[产业[秽展的淘汰。 Either way, the essential moral of the story of LTCB and Shinsei is this: Whatever system Japan uses to move capital around the economywhether it does this by bankers or capital market investors-it needs to find some method of doing this more effectively and flexibly, to let its economy adapt to_ changing circumstances, and above all, remove dead wood outworn institutions.， adopting ostrich-like approach _ policy making decade-and refusing to take painful decisions-Japan has not made the challenges go away. Nor has it made them less painful or costly to deal with. The biggest single lesson from LTCB, in other words, is that collective policy denial and procrastination can carry a terrible cost, both in terms of wasted resources and human lives. And that is a moral that the leaders of any economy forget at their peril-be 六
Germany, Britain， America or Japan. 无 论如何，长期信用银行(LTCB) 与 新生银行(Shinsei) 的故事所揭示的核心警示在于: 无论日本通过银行家抑或资 本市场投资者来调配经济资本，它都必须找到一种更高效、 要任务便是彻底清除体制内的沉积整与过时架构。过去十 年间，日本采取一种舵鸟式的政策取向, 执意回避痛苦 抉择， 但这并未消解挑战本 身，反而令其应对代价愈发沉重、创伤 愈 发深重。换言之，LTCB 案例赋予世人最重大的启示是: 集体性的政策回避与拖延 ，终将支付惨痛 成本，这不仅意味 着资源的巨大浪费, 更将碾碎无数个体的人生。而这一警示， 任何经济体的领导者惨须铭记于心，否则必自陷险 境，无论 德国、英国、美国，抑或日本自身。 Rrologye 序言 THE KID FROM KENTUCKY 来自肯塔基的小伙子 How did a kid from Kentucky end up buying one of the largest Japanese banks? is a question that a lot of people might wonder.
-Tim Collins 一个 来自肯塔基州的年轻人怎么最终能买下日 本当时最大 的银行 之一? 或许，很多人会好奇这个问题的答案。 -蒂 姆.柯林斯 Tim Collins eased into seat 1C on the ANAflight from New York to Tokyo next to a wizened Japanese man who had a distinguished air about him. Since the Sixty-nine-year-old Japanese man was sitting in the first-class section where tickets cost more than $10,OOO each, he was also clearly either rich or important---or both. 当蒂 姆.柯林斯 (Tim Collins )缓步踏入全日空航空公司(ANA) 从纽约飞往东京航班的1C 座位时 ，邻座是一位身形干瘦的 日 本老者，周身透着不凡气度。这位年届六十九岁 的日 本老 人身处头等舱，单程票价逾一万美元的舱位，其身份显然要 么富有，要人么位高权重 ，或两者兼而有之。 “Who’s that’ Collins wondered. lt was a question that he often asked. For one of Collins’s
distress. 这《结识 人物) 正是他常提的问题。因为柯林斯 毕生的重要 能力之 一 ，便是善于网罗人脉资源，并能在日后将这些资源 转化为巨大优势。这项技能在其这去四十三年人生中展建奇 功。他生于美国南方一个曾经营肯塔基州烟草农场的家族， 早年在当地汽车工厂开启职业生涯，后入读商学院，最终扎 根华尔街 成为投资银行家，此后又自我转型为企业重组专家。 1995 年 ，他再度重塑自我，成为一名企业家。他创立了一 家名为Ripplewood 的投资 机构，该名称源于其家族音日的 肯塔基烟草农场 。该公司的营利模式在于低价收购陷入困境 的企业 ，经重组 后转售获利。柯林斯习惯称其 为”私募股权” 或“重组基金”，并以一种近乎宗教布道般的肃穆热忱宣称， 该事业彰显了美国资本主义制度的部分精朵。他坚称，自己 的基金通过”创造性破坏”清除企业界的沉疾积弊，从而赋能 美国经济迈向更高生产力与效率。我笃信以资本为变革的俊 化剂?他经常如此说道。令柯林斯 尾恼的是，Ripplewood有 时亦被冠 以“ 秃鹰基金”之名，意指那些专门在困境企业中捡 食腐肉 的机构。 Either way，Ripplewood rapidly expanded, gobbling up an auto parts company in Texas, an English-muffin maker in Ohio, and a refrigerator manufacturer in Ilinois. Another
acquisition was a frozen-pie company based in Hope， Arkansas. “And | have to say, we are the largest employer in Hopel!” Collins liked to tell his investors, with a significant chuckle. “As in Hope, Arkansas.” That was Collins’s way of letting people know he had powerful friends in Washington， New York，and London. Hope，Arkansas. As in，the birthplace of Bill Clinton. 无 论如何，Ripplewood 迅速扩张版图，它大肆知并了德克 萨斯州 的汽车零部件公司 、俄亥俄州的英式松饼生产 商，以 及伊利诺伊州的冰箱制造商。另一笔收购则瞄准了阿肯色州 霍普镇(Hope) 的一家冷冻馅饼企业。看老唐星球 加入 xmtx 93 001” 我必须强调，我们如今是霍普镇的头号雇主! “柯林斯 总爱意味深长地笑着向投资者宣告，“没错，就是 阿肯色 州的霍普镇。” 这实则是柯林斯向外界传递的暗号: 他的权力网络 已深植于华盛顿 、纽约与伦敦的核心圈层。霍 普镇，阿肯色州，此地正是比尔:克林顿 的出生地。 But, as Collins eased into seat 1C on the plane to Tokyo in September 1998，he was starting to think bigger than Arkansas-outrageously big，in fact. A few years earlien， when he had been trying raise funds，Collins had approached Japan’s mighty trading company，Mitsubishi Corporation. To his delight，Mitsubishi had taken a large
in Ripplewood，and Collins had become curious about Japan. There was little in his background that made Tokyo” a natural destination for Collins. He was a Southern American boy-or a “kid from Kentucky”as he liked to Say-who believed in the importance of the family，free markets, the Democratic Party and Baptist church. One of his favorite books was Pilgrims in Their Own Land, the story of how the Protestant ethic had infused American culture. Indeed，Collins had once considered becoming a minister,，before he decided that his red talent in life was making money. 然而，当柯林斯于1998 年 9 月踏入飞往东京的航班 时，他 的商业野心早已超越阿肯色 州的版图。事 实上，此 刻他正酝 酿 一场惊 世骇 俗的宏大布局。数年 前，当柯林斯为 Ripplewood 资本筹集资金 时，曾接洽日本财闪巨头三凌商 事(Mitsubishi Corporation)。仿他惊喜 的是,三萎商事最终 成为Ripplewood 的重要股东。这段合作激发了柯林斯对日 本的强烈 好奇，尽管其个人背景与东京几乎毫无联系。这位 自调” 肯塔基小子”的美国南方 人，其精神内核深植于“家族 纽带、自由市场、民主党理念与浸信会信仰之中。他人挚爱的 著作《故土朝圣者》(Pilgrims in Their Own Land) 曾深刻 剖析新教伦理如何重塑美国文化基因。事 实上，在发 觉 自己
职人员。 Though Japan was a very alien land, it fascinated Collins. From a distance, the place seemed bizarre. Back in the 1980s, like most Americans，Collins had been dazzles by Japan’s power. But then everything had gone badly wrong and for an entire decade Japan’s economy had stagnated. Since 1990, more than one quadrillion yen (Y1,000 trillion or$10 trillion) of Japan’s wealth had been destroyed by the crashi; the debt to GDP ratio had soared toward percent，higher than anywhere else in the industrialized world, and the banks had become engulfed with more than Y100 trilion of bad loans. This was equivalent to a trillion dollars，a_ Sum as large as the British economy. More baffling still-at least in Collins’s eyes-was the way Japan’s government had responded. It seemed self-evidently dear that Japan desperately needed restructuring. lt had remove the excess debt, get rid of its deadbeat companies， and revamp the business culture. In short, Japan urgently needed to do on a_ macro scale the type of “cleanup” process Ripplewood performed whenever Collins purchased a company. 尽管日本对柯林斯而言是一片完全陌生的国度 ，却令他深深
着迷。远观之 下，这片土地处处透着话诵。回溯1980 年代， 柯林斯 与大多数美国人一样，曾为日本的经济霸权目眩神迷。 然而随后形势急转直下，整 整十年间，日本经济深陷泥潭停 自1990 年起，日本逾一千万亿日元〈约合10 万亿美元) 的 财富在崩盘中灰飞烟灭;其债务与GDP 之比飙升至150%， 高居工业化世界榜首; 银行系统更被超过100 万亿日 元坏账 吞噬，这笔相当于英国全年经济总量的万亿美元窟 密，人恰似 一柄达摩克利斯之剑高悬。最令柯林斯 匪夷所思的，是日本 政府 的应对之道。在他眼中，日本亟需结构性重组的事实不 言自 明:必须 齐除债务毒瘤、肃 清僵尸 企业、重塑商业文化。 简而言之，日本程待一 场国家层面 的“大扫除”，而这正是 Ripplewood 所擅长的。 Such a plan may have seemed self-evident to Collins, yet the Japanese government had sat on its hands, year after year, seemingly unwilling or unable to tackle the situation. To _ Collins，that paralysis seemed not just foolish，but morally wrong. He believed-like most Americans-in the concept of action and individual responsibility. He also assumed that a key role of a government was to make its citizens as rich as possible.
这番改革蓝图在柯林斯眼中不 言自明 ，然而日本政府 却年复 一年地袖手和旁观，看仪既无意愿也无能力破局。这 种猴痪状 态于柯林斯 而言，不仅是愚不可及，更是厚颜无 耻。他秉承 着典型 的美式信和条，行动 至上与个人责任，并坚信政府的核 心使命在于使国民财富 最大化。 Yet, Collins was also an optimist-and opportunist. He could see the potential profits lurking strange Situation in Japan. What was happening in Japan was not unique: Back in the 1970s, for example, American industry had also grown flabby, complacent and paralyzed, creating economic problems. The American private equity business had eventually emerged-and made private equity firms Very rich-from the discovery of ways to reclaim exhausted dilapidated companies.， Although concept private equity was _ unknown in Japan and Tokyo had traditionally been hostile to foreign investors in general， Collins believed that Japan would become the next great theater business turnaround，No economy could stagger on in this type of self-destructive limbo forever he reasoned. And when change came, this create amazing opportunities foreigners.，A corporate shake-out was the only way that the economy truly saved _ current decline，
generations of American pioneers before him，Collins believed it was time to head west. 然而 ，柯林斯本质上是个乐观主义者，更是个机会主义者。 他看到了日本这个奇怪局势中潜藏的巨大潜在利润。日 本的 境遇 并非孤例: 回溯1970 年代,，美国工业同样曾深陷且肿、 自满 与准痪的泥潭，催生重重经济积弊。而最终诞生的美国 私募股权业(private equity), 正是通过发掘改造相朽企业之 道 ，让资本巨甸赚得盆满钵满。尽管私募股权的概念在日本 尚属陌生，且日本建制派 一如既往对外资充满戒备 ，柯林斯 却笃信: 日本必将成为下一幕商业重组大戏的核心舞台。他 认为 ，任何经济都不可能永远在这种自我 毁灭性的停滞状态 中徘徊 不前。而当变革降临, 这将为外国人创造惊人的机会。 只有通过公司 重组，经济才能真正从当前的衰退中拯救出来。 就像他之前的 几代美国开拓者一样 ，柯林斯认为现在是时候 向西前进了。 The plane carrying Collins and his Japanese seatmate made its way slowly up over the Rocky Mountains, traveled high above the Alasksan waste, and began to crawl down over the ocean past the Aleution and Kurile Islands toward Japan. Half an hour before the fight landed in Tokyo， Collins caught the eye of the mysterious Japanese man. “So why are you going to Tokyo?” Collins asked, with the
expansive friendliness of an American overseas.“what do YOU do?” 载着柯林斯 与邻座日本人的航班，正虹星攀升 越过落基山脉， 申群岛 与千岛群岛，向日 枕蜂而去。降落东京 前半小时， 柯林斯的目光做然锁住那位神秘的日本乘客。“所以，您为何 前 往东京? ” 他带着美国人海外特有的自来熟式热情 发问 敢问阁下从事哪一行? ” “1 am retired” the Japanese man answered，in perfect English. Prodded, he explained in vague terms that he had once worked in banking and the oil industry-but now was living in London. “鄙人 已退隐江湖 。” 老者以纯正英语答道 。经柯林斯 追问， 他隐上提及曾涉足银行业与石油产业，而今则宛居伦敦。 Collinss mind went into overdrive. A Japanese banker? Who worked in industry? With foreign connections? Who looked about sixty-nine? Suddenly it _clicked and Collins could barely believe his Iluck. 柯林斯 的大脑骤然全速运转: 日本银行家? 有实业背景? 具
国际 人脉? 年约六十九? 电光火石间 ，线索了骤然 贯通，他几 乎难以置信此等天赐良机。 Masamoto Yashiro’” declared，The Japanese man nodded，surprised; he was not used to people recognizing him. “How do you know? “您一定是八城政基先生!” 柯林斯斩钉截铁 。老者诈然颌首; 他向来不习惯 被人认出。“您如何得知? ” Collins switched on the charm and reached for a file of papers. Before he had boarded the ANA plane in New York， Collins _ had asked his friends on Wall Street and Washington if they knew of any Japanese businessmen who might be willing to help him bring the gospel restructuring to Japan. Rick Bradock, the former head of Citibank-and another “friend’” Collins-had offered particularly_ interesting Masamoto Yashiro，the former chairman of Citibank’s own operations in Japan. The man sounded intriguing: Yashiro was a close friend of _ Reed，the former chairman of Citibank，and had spent his whole life working for foreign firms, which meant that he was probably well versed with the concepts of restructuring and private equity Collins reasoned. Howeven，
the elderly Japanese man was also connected to some of powerful _politicians， businessmen， bureaucrats Japan. fact，Yashiro connected that Collins was unsure whether he would be persuade Yashiro him-an unknown American-at all. 柯林斯瞬时启动社交磁力场 ，伸手取出一亚文件档案。在纽 约登上美国航空公司的飞机之 前 ，柯林斯询问了他在华尔街 和华盛顿的朋友们是否知道任何可能愿意帮助他将重组福 音带到日本的日本商人。柯林斯的” 老友” 之一、花旗前 掌门 人里克: 布拉多克 ，给出了一个关键名字:八 城政基，这位 执掌花旗日本分行的金融巨 忌。看老唐星球加和蕉Xmtx 93 001 此人履历丰富: 八城不仅是花旗前主席约翰:里德的莫逆之交 更毕生效力于外资机 构，这也意味着他深说重组与私幕股 权之道。然此老亦与日本政商官僚顶层圈盘根错节。事 实上 ，八城的联系如此紧密，以至于柯林斯不确定他是否能够 说服八城与他这个不知名的美国 人交谈。 But now Yashiro was sitting right next to him on the plane， in seat 1A. Fate—or God-seemed to be on Collins’s side. “1 have been looking for you, looking everywherel You have this wonderful reputation!” Jubilantly，Collins waved fles at the Japanese man, pointing out Yashiro’s CV.
而此刻 ，八城竞与他比邻而坐于1A 席。天命《〈或 日神明) 全然站在柯林斯 一侧。“ 我一直在找您，到处都 找! 您有着 极好的声誉! ”柯林斯 兴奋地挥舞着他的文件，向这位日本 人展示着他本人的简历。 Yashiro eyed the American man curiously. It was extremely odd，by Japanese standards,， for a stranger to accost Somebody on an airplane Japan’s culture reserved and polite, everybody acts according to the twin guidelines of hierarchy and harmony.， But Yashiro had Spent decades of his life trying to bridge the vast cultural gulf that separated America and Japan and he knew Wall Street men were apt to do strange things. “Why do you want to talk to me?” Yashiro asked. 八城政基好奇地看着那个美国人。在 日本的文化 规范 中 ，陌 生人于航班上如此唐突搭训实属基夷所思。这个国度 向来克 制守礼，人人皆依循”等级秩序”与”和谐共生” 的双重 圭捍 行事 。但 ，八城花了几十年的 时间来弥合美国和日 本之间巨 大的文化鸿沟，深说华尔街来客常有惊人之举。“你为什么想 和我说话? ” 八 城问道。 Collins _hastily pitch，He described
Ripplewood did and explained that he wanted to take its operations to Japan. After all，he pointed out，Japan urgently needed to reform its economy-and the country Seemed to be opening up to new ideas and to the outside world. 柯林斯 赶忙提出他的建议。他描述了Ripplewood 公司 所做 的事，并解释说 ，他想将它的业务拓展到日本。他指出，毕 亮日本人迫切需要改革其经 济，这个国家似乎正在向 新思想和 外部世界 开放。 Yashiro，like many men of his generation，was feeling rather downhearted about the state of his nation. As a child he had suffered the horrors of World War Il and forthe past five decades he had watched with immense pride as Japan had rebuilt itself after defeat. But now, in the 1990s, this miracle had lost its magic powers. Yashiro was convinced that the only way to fix these problems was to introduce radical reform into the corporate world by importing fresh ideas, vision, and energy. Indeed he believed that he had a duty to help promote this change. But Yashiro also knew that Japan was a consensus-based culture. And thus far change had been painfully dishearteningly slow.
八城与同辈的许多同胞一样 ，对祖国现状深感忧患重重。童 年时 期 ，他曾饱受二战浩劫之苦，此后五十年 间，他无比自 豪，目睹了日本在战败后重建家园。然而步入1990 年代， 这一奇迹已经失去魔力 。八 城深信 ，解决当下困境 的唯一途 径是向企业界引入全新理念 、视野与活力，推行激进 改革。 他自觉肩负着推动这场变革的责任 。但八城同样深知，日本 文化 源于共识，人迄今改革的步伐缓慢得令人痛苦且泪丧。 The arrival of some outsiders, like this chatty Mr. Collins， could possibly he$ to shake the country up. It was not such a strange idea. Yashiro knew that Americans had helped trigger change in Japan before. Most Japanese believed that the only reason why the country had embarked on its stunningly Successful industrialization nineteenth _ century for example，was because American black warships had sailed across the Pacific and forced their way into Japanese waters, shocking the old shogun government with their military might. The arrival of the American soldiers in 1945 had acted as another “shock’” that propelled the country toward its postwar economic miracle. 一些外来者的到 来 ，比如这个健谈的柯林斯 先生，可能会给 这个国家带来震动。此想法并非无稽 之谈 。八 城深知，美国
人曾数次推动日本变革 。例如，多数日本人都认同 ，19 世纪 该国之所以能开启惊人成功的工业化进程，契机便是美国黑 色军需横跨太平 洋，以武力强行驶入日本海域，其军事威慑 彻底震动 了旧幕 府统治。而1945 年美军 士兵的到来，则成 为助推日本实现战后经济奇迹的又一剂”强心针”。 Moreover Yashiro also knew that inside Japan itself there were some intriguing hints of change. Just before he had boarded the plane in New York，the newspapers had carried the news that Long Term Credit Bank one of the countrys most prestigious banks，was on the verge of collapse _ government considering nationalizing the bank before selling it to new owners， perhaps even Americans. lt seemed to be a shocking development.， Yashiro president Katsunobu Onogi- relatively well from his days at Citibank; he figured that the bank’s history epitomized everything that had gone wrong with the Japanese corporate system in recent years. The bank was, after all, a cornerstone of the postwar financial world, once the ninth largest bank in the world. Just a few years earlier it would have seemed inconceivable that the government should sell it. 更令八城深思的是，日 本本土已现变草的微妙征兆。就 在他
纽约 登机前夕 ，报章披露日本声誉卓著的长期信贷银行 CLTCB) 濒临倒闭，政府正考虑将其国有化后转售新主， 甚至不排除售予美资机构。这一剧变堪称石破天惊 。八城在 花旗任职 期间曾 与LTCB 及其时任行长大野木克信 (Katsunobu Onogi) 多有交集; 他洞悉该行的兴衰史正是 近年来日本企业体制沉疾的微观缩影 。须知这家银行 堪称战 后金融体系的基石支柱，曾位列全球第九大银行。仅 仅数年 前，政府将其出售的设想仍属不可想象。 “Will you have dinner with me?” Collins eagerly asked, as the plane finally landed at Narita airport in Tokyo, after its fourteen-hour journey， Collins desperately needed Japanese ally to help him relize his dreams. Warily, Yashiro agreed to meet Collins again. He was far from sure that he wanted to work Ripplewood.， But he always discussing what was wrong with Japan’s economy-and what could be done to fix it, Its just a dinner’ there is no commitment, Yashiro thought. 历经 十四小时飞行，当航班终于降落在东京成田机场 时，柯 林斯急切 地问道: “能与您共进晚餐吗? ” 他迫切需要一位日 本盟友来实现宏图 。八 城谨慎 地应多了会面。看老唐星球加 币Xmtx 93 001他尚未确定是否加入Ripplewood 资本，却始 终热衷探讨日本经济证结及其破局之道。” 只是顿饭而已，无 需承诺什么”，他暗自 思导。
lt was only later that he realized that the plane ride was the starting point of one of the strangest financial experiments ever Seen between Tokyo and Wall Street; a journey that would eventually pull Collins and Yashiro into the tangled history of LTCB and deep into the thorny question of what had gone wrong with Japan’s banks-and what might be done to fix them. 直到 后来他才意识到，这趟航程竞成为东京与华尔街 之间最 详异金融实验的起点，这上段旅途终将把柯林斯与八城卷入长 期信用银行(LTCB) 的纠葛历史，并迫使 他们 直面日本银 行业的沉疾根源及其可能采取的纠治措施。
CHRONOLOGY 大事记 1853: American warships force their way into Japanese waters triggering the Meijii Restoration. 1853 年: 美国军舰强行邮入日本水域 ，日 本开启“明治维 友参注: 有购冶给谣奸19 世纪60 千代夫朋天在吓方工业文史 证击下进疗录一努会面吗化与现代化司形运动。1868 合吸滩 天 旺久有《五条章文少共心内个自括: 碟治上人寿藻盏是、 如需央天糯丰,寿险 者建风份制度; 经六上人推厅“殉 挛兴业了 列壕吗方贡大发代茵天主义工让业; 等下上人笑厅在乓着，建 立太式宪失; 文化 上入近“ 文史开化” 部有到近代复育。这 努 忱形允月天过壮娘起为亚洲器压 ，雷甩了民歼启大，和人保 贸了者建残耸，刁终走上允外保哆及起的血压二义这踊。 Nippon Kangyo _ created Japanese government to help Japan’s “catch up”” with the 1897 年: 日本政府创建日本劝业银行，以期助力日本”追赶
1941: Japan enters World War |. 1941 年: 日本加入第二次世界大战。 请少注: 鼻到芝负三的屠贷，理矶在心篇圾砍涪全娩， (bbjbjb 记7。 1945: Japan is defeated by America and the U.S. military administration takes control. 1945 年: 日本战败 于美国，美国军事占领 日本并实施 管制。 训玫注: 1945 和例8 请6 万，类厨健包代扣为“仆 舅并”的 贷子彤李此万天全必 。效/ 1952: The United States hands power back to a Japanese government， |Ikeda council postwar financial plan, including the creation of the long-term credit bank system.In December the Long Term Credit Bank is created out of part of Nippon Kangyo Bank. 1952 年: 美国向日本政府移交主权后，池田勇人领导 的大 藏省审议 会制定了战后金融重建 计划，其中核心举措包括建
立长期信用银行体系。同年12 月，日本劝业银行CNippon Kangyo Bank) 的长期信贷部门被拆分重组，正式成立长期 信用银行(Long Term Credit Bank，简称LTCB)。 Japan’s period economic growth-the “miracle”-starts. 1953 年: 日本经济高速增长期,“奇迹”开始了。 1961: LTCB moves to a new headquarters in Otemachii its business booms. 年:长 期信用银行(LTCB) 迁址东京大手叮COtemachi) 新 总部大厦，业务发展也进入爆发期 1968: Japans economy grows So fast that its output of goods and services Surpasses that of West Germany and every other capitalist country except Americal. 1968 年:日本经济迅独发展,其商品与服务产出总量于1968 年超越西德, 跃居资本主义世界第二大经济 体, 仅次于美国。 1973: The oil shock slows growth; LTCB steps up overseas expansion.
1973 年: 石油危机(Oil Shock) 导致 经济增长放缓; 长期 信用银行(LTCB) 开局 海外扩张战略。 1975: Japanese government starts to _ create a bond market in Japan，effectively undermining the old LTCB System. 1975 年: 日本政府着手建立本国债券市场(bond market)， 此举从根本上动摇了长 期信用银行体系(LTCB System) 的 特权 地位。 部少注: 众炒可以在亡努上让失敬人孟，斤厄拟天的问蕉怖区 1985: LTCB draws up a reform plan calling for the bank to move away from traditional lending to _ new investment banking businessesi it is blocked by vested interests. The yen strengthens after the “Plaza accord.”Japan’s asset price “bubble” becomes entrenched. 1985 年: 长期信用银行(LTCB) 拟订改革方案，呼 吁从传 统贷款业务转向新兴投资银行业务 ，但该计划遭到既得利益 集团阻拦。随着“广场协议”(Plaza Accord) 签订后日 元大